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Abstract This study analyzes data on households’ risk
perception and protective behavior following a natural
disaster triggered technological accident (Natech accident)
that occurred at an industrial park in Sendai during the
Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami, on 11 March
2011. The results indicate that some households carried out
multiple evacuations and that households’ risk perceptions
changed throughout the Natech accident evacuation pro-
cess. Risk perception differed according to household
location and demographic characteristics. We also found
differences in the protective measures adopted for house-
holds in different locations. Specifically, those living closer
to the Natech accident tended to evacuate immediately,
whereas those living further away tended to shelter in
place. Wind direction is discussed as a factor that influ-
ences households’ risk perception and evacuation response
to a Natech accident. The findings of this study advance
knowledge of household behavior in response to a Natech
accident and can assist emergency managers in developing
strategies for better management of evacuation processes.
Keywords Evacuation behavior · Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami · Natech accidents · Protective
actions · Risk perception
1 Introduction
A natural disaster triggered technological accident (Natech
accident) was first defined by Showalter and Myers (1992)
when they reviewed the causes of chemical accidents
triggered by natural hazard events. Natechs triggered by
several natural hazards have been studied including by
earthquakes (Lindell and Perry 1997), hurricanes (Cruz and
Krausmann 2008), floods (Cozzani et al. 2010), lightening
(Krausmann et al. 2011), and tsunami (Krausmann and
Cruz 2013). Natech accidents, which make up about 3% of
all reported hazmat releases between 1990 and 2008 in the
United States, were reported as the cause of a small frac-
tion of human impacts in the country (Sengul et al. 2012).
In the European Union, Krausmann and Baranzini (2012)
have also studied and reported on Natech accidents. It is
expected that climate change and the presence of increased
populations in areas subject to high risk from natural
hazards may result in greater human impacts from Natech
accidents in the future.
Natech accidents often occur over extensive geograph-
ical areas due to the large impact zone of natural hazard
events (Seteinberg et al. 2008). Natech accidents are often
accompanied by fires, explosions, and/or toxic releases.
The areas that could be affected by such hazards may also
expand at any time through cascading chemical accidents
and effects if Natech accident cannot be controlled in an
effective and timely manner. Thus, large numbers of resi-
dents in a relatively large area may need to take protective
actions (for example, evacuation, shelter in place). How-
ever, in the context of a Natech accident, people have to
face at least two hazards within a limited time. The Natech
accident that occurred during the Great East Japan Earth-
quake and Tsunami on 11 March 2011 is a good example.
Many residents living near an affected industrial park in
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Sendai initially evacuated due to the earthquake and/or
tsunami. With the retreat of the tsunami, some evacuees
left the evacuation shelters and returned home. Then, fol-
lowing the occurrence of a Natech accident at a nearby
refinery 5 h later, residents were confronted with the
decision to evacuate again or not, based on their own risk
perceptions of the threat posed by the huge fires and smoke
coming from the accident.
This study presents the results of a random household
survey on risk perceptions and behavioral responses fol-
lowing a Natech accident at the oil refinery in Sendai,
Japan after the 2011 earthquake and tsunami. The authors
specifically address four questions:
1. How did household Natech accident risk perception
change throughout the evacuation process?
2. What protective actions did households take in
response to the Natech accident?
3. What differences are there in risk perceptions and
protective behavior according to household location?
4. Which groups had higher risk perception levels and
were more likely to adopt protective measures?
2 Literature Review
Risk perception has been found to be a key factor in
motivating protective actions such as evacuation behavior
(Baker 1991; Fitzpatrick and Mileti 1991; Sorensen
1991, 2000; Riad et al. 1999; Mileti and Peek 2000;
Tierney et al. 2001; Dash and Gladwin 2007; Sorensen and
Sorensen 2007; Lindell 2012, 2013; Lindell and Prater
2012). Baker (1991) reviewed more than 12 sample sur-
veys on hurricane evacuation in the United States from
1961 to 1989. Prior perception of personal risk, the risk
level (hazardousness) commonly associated with an area,
action by public authorities, housing protective quality, and
storm-specific threat factors were found to largely account
for evacuation behavior. The author found that residents
who felt unsafe staying where they were (perceived con-
sequences) during a storm tended to leave, and those who
felt safe (no perceived consequences) tended to stay. Riad
et al. (1999) analyzed why people sometimes decide not to
evacuate from a dangerous situation based on a resident
interview survey after Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew. They
found that not perceiving the hurricane as a threat and
believing one’s home was a safe place were the most
common reasons for not evacuating.
The above studies examined risk perception and pro-
tective actions during hurricanes. Only a few studies have
analyzed risk perception of and protective actions to
technological threats. Mileti and Peek (2000) reviewed
the process of forming perceptions and how this process
affects public response to warnings of a nuclear power
plant emergency. The authors found that the formation of
risk perception is guided by the stimulations, cues, and so
on that people secure from their environment (for exam-
ple, warning information), and that this risk perception
formation leads to protective actions. This process is not
different than that found for other types of hazard agents
(Mileti and Peek 2000). Risk perception leading to pro-
tective actions was also confirmed by a study that ana-
lyzed evacuation behavior in response to a chlorine spill
at Graniteville, South Carolina, in 2005 (Mitchell et al.
2005).
The potential influence of risk perception on people’s
response to Natech accidents has been limited. Indeed, only
a few studies have attempted to address this issue. In a
counter-factual study, Steinberg et al. (2004) examined
emergency preparedness and earthquake hazard mitigation
for the potential impact of an earthquake-induced haz-
ardous materials release from an oil refinery in a southern
California community based on a random telephone sur-
vey. The authors also investigated residents’ risk percep-
tion to Natech hazard events. They found a nonsignificant
relationship between risk perception and preparedness and
mitigation. Perceived risk and corresponding actions may
differ when people actually experience a Natech accident
in real life (Steinberg et al. 2004). This article provides
insights on risk perception and the consequent protective
actions taken during an actual Natech event, the fires at the
Sendai industrial park triggered by the 2011 earthquake
and tsunami.
Many factors have been studied to understand their
influence on risk perception and evacuation behavior.
Relationships between risk perception and proximity to
hazards have been discussed for hurricanes (Peacock et al.
2005), floods (Siebeneck and Cova 2012), earthquakes
(Lindell and Perry 2000), and hazards resulting from haz-
ardous industrial facilities (Lindell and Earle 1983). A
recent study examined how risk perception changed with
time throughout an evacuation process and found higher
risk perception levels occurred while evacuees were stay-
ing at evacuation shelters (Siebeneck and Cova 2012). In
another study, Lin et al. (2014) examined risk perception
changes of evacuees during Hurricane Ike. They found that
households believed that their homes were much more
dangerous when the storm made landfall (Lin et al. 2014).
Zelinsky and Kisinski (1991) pointed out that the distance-
decay principle generally applies to the movement of
evacuees in evacuations for both natural and technological
disasters (Zelinski and Kisinski 1991). The authors also
reported that evacuation direction is unpredictable unless
the physical impact of the disaster is directional in nature.
Home elevation was found to be an important hurricane
evacuation predictor (Baker 1991).
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Demographic variables have also been examined in sev-
eral studies on risk perception and evacuation behavior.
However, most demographic variables (other than gender)
have weak and inconsistent correlations with risk perception
and protective responses (Baker 1991; Lindell and Perry
2000; Lindell 2013). Stern et al. (1993) found that females
are associated with higher risk perception levels than are
males. The authors explain that women are more aware than
men of the consequences of events; therefore women are
more likely to develop beliefs about the consequences of
hazardous situations. Several studies have found that women
were more likely to evacuate for hurricanes (Bateman and
Edwards 2002; Lindell et al. 2005; Huang et al. 2012), and
they were also more likely to respond to earthquake after-
shocks (Mileti and O’Brien 1992) and hurricane warnings
(Bateman and Edwards 2002). But a recent flood evacuation
survey of three communities in Hat Yai, Thailand, found that
men were more likely to evacuate than women (Luathep
et al. 2013). The authors also reported that the households
with a larger number of children or elderly persons were less
likely to evacuate. Thus, it is highly possible that many
women stayed to take care of children and elderly persons.
Huang et al. (2012), who observed that being older corre-
lated with a lower risk perception for hurricanes, explained
that older people tended to expect less personal impact
(Huang et al. 2012). In contrast, age was reported positively
correlated with the risk perception of coastal flood risks
(Kellens et al. 2011).
Age is also an inconsistent contributor for protective
actions. Older people were found to be less likely to
evacuate for floods (Luathep et al. 2013) or to respond to
earthquake aftershock warnings (Mileti and O’Brien 1992);
but other studies have found that there were no correlations
between age and hurricane evacuation (Baker 1991). Other
variables were also discussed. For example, family size
(household size) was found to have a negative, but not
significant, correlation with evacuation from hurricanes in
Florida (Solis et al. 2009), and no consistent evidence was
found for the notion that people’s evacuation behavior
depends on how long they had lived in the coastal area
(Baker 1991). These inconsistent results increased interest
in examining the role demographic variables play in
affecting people’s risk perception and protective actions to
Natech accidents. Furthermore, in the context of a Natech
accident, the risk perception changes may be different,
because multiple evacuations may be involved.
3 Event Description
A 9.0 magnitude earthquake struck off the Pacific coast of
the Tohoku area (Northeast Japan), on 11 March 2011 at
14:46 (local time). This quake was registered as the most
powerful earthquake in the history of Japan (Mimura et al.
2011), and the fourth most intense ever recorded in the
world (USGS 2014). The earthquake triggered a tsunami
with run-up heights in excess of 39 m, which resulted in
15,889 people dead and 2594 missing (NPA 2014).
According to the report by the Ministry of Land, Infras-
tructure, Transport and Tourism of Japan (MLITT 2014),
about 535 km2 of coastal lowlands were inundated totally
or partially, destroying 220,000 buildings. Moreover, the
earthquake and tsunami caused damage to oil storage tanks
and other hazardous materials facilities in petrochemical
industrial complexes. Nishi (2012) reported that 1404
hazmat facilities were damaged by the earthquake’s strong
ground motion and 1807 hazmat facilities were damaged
by the tsunami. A major Natech accident occurred at an oil
refinery in an industrial park near Sendai, resulting in
severe consequences for nearby residents. The tsunami
resulted in several evacuation warnings, the first being
given just minutes after the main earthquake shock. In
addition, the Natech accident forced local officials to order
an evacuation of residents in a 2 km radius around the
refinery (Yamagochi 2012), which included several tsu-
nami evacuation shelters.
The Sendai refinery is large, occupying 1.5 km2, and is
physically located across three different jurisdictions:
Tagajo city, Shichigahama town, and Sendai city. The
location and layout of the refinery is presented in Fig. 1. At
21:25 on the day of the earthquake, fires broke out at the
eastern part of the refinery in the industrial complex in
Sendai (Yamagochi 2012). The fires occurred at the refin-
ery’s asphalt tanks, a gasoline tank, several molten sulfur
tanks, and a shipping yard (Nishi 2012). The cause of fires
was unknown, but Zama et al. (2012) believed that a
floating oil spill was ignited due to a spark caused by the
collision between tank lorries and oil handling facilities
during the tsunami.
As indicated in Table 1, a big tsunami warning was
issued at 15:15 on the day of the earthquake. Fifteen
minutes after receiving the big tsunami warning, refinery
staff began to walk to a primary school (evacuation shelter)
located in Shichigahama town about 2 km away. When the
fire broke out at 21:25, the evacuated staff made a request
to the local officials to issue an evacuation order for resi-
dents living near the refinery. Given the difficulties with
communication systems and the ongoing tsunami warning,
the Shichigahama authorities issued an evacuation order in
the morning of the next day (9:25 on March 12). About 1 h
later, Tagajo city also issued an evacuation order (10:16 on
March 12). Sendai city was the last to issue evacuation
orders at 7:30 on March 13. The fires were extinguished by
14:30 on March 15 (Yamagochi 2012), and all evacuation
orders were canceled at 15:00 on March 15 (Shichigahama
2012; Tagajo 2012).
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4 Methodology
In this study, data collection involved two person-to-person
field surveys and one mail survey in order to understand
residents’ attitudes and protective actions such as evacua-
tion due to Natech accidents. We were also interested in
collecting information concerning damage caused by the
2011 Natech accident and the evacuation order issuing
process. The first person-to-person survey was conducted
on 10 November 2013. Thirteen residents living within
3 km of the affected refinery were randomly selected and
interviewed. The second person-to-person survey,
supported by the ResTO-TerRiN Project,1 was carried out
from 17 to 20 March 2014. During the investigation, we
interviewed the personnel at the refinery as well as disaster
management officers who experienced or were in charge of
investigating the Natech accidents triggered by the Great
East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami.
Fig. 1 Location and layout of Sendai refinery. Source Base map Yamagochi (2012)
Table 1 Event time line. Source Shichigahama (2012), Tagajo (2012) and Yamagochi (2012)
Date Time Event
3.11 02:46 p.m. Earthquake
03:15 p.m. Big tsunami warning
03:30 p.m. Refinery staff began to evacuate to the shelter at Shichigahama town
03:50 p.m. Tsunami arrived
05:10 p.m. Observed black smoke from the refinery
05:25 p.m. Big fire broke out
09:30 p.m. Refinery staffs requested Shichigahama town to evacuate residents
3.12 9:25 a.m. Shichigahama town issued evacuation order
10:26 a.m. Tagajo city issued evacuation order
3.13 07:30 a.m. Sendai city issued evacuation order
3.15 02:30 p.m. Fire extinguished
3.15 03:00 p.m. Evacuation order cancelled
1 ResTO-TerRiN Project: French Ministry of Ecology, Sustainable
Development and Energy (MEDDE) funded project, entitled Contri-
bution to the Systemic Modeling of Technical and Organizational
Resilience of a Territory to Natech Risk: from microscopic to
macroscopic (2013–2016).
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A household survey questionnaire was developed in
order to study risk perception and behavioral responses to
the Natech accident, taking into consideration the research
questions, past literature, and person-to-person interviews.
We used the Zenrin Co., Ltd2 detailed address database as a
sampling frame. A random sample of households living
within an area of 2.5 km from the hazard source was taken.
The questionnaires were sent out on 31 March 2014,
indicating a due date on 25 May 2014.
Based on our interviews with refinery officials, the
primary hazard source was liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
tanks in the tank farm that was located close to the fire
site. Although the fires did not start at the LPG tanks,
these represented the main threat to residents if the fire
spread and caused these LPG tanks to explode. Respon-
dents were selected from households at increments of
0.5 km from 1 to 2.5 km from the center of the LPG tank
farm to the residential area. A disproportionate stratified
sampling technique was utilized. The area was divided
according to distance and direction from the Natech
accident as shown in Fig. 2a. Four hundred respondents
were sampled from each area for a total number of 1732
respondents. About 1 month later, a second mailing was
sent to nonrespondents after addresses were checked. A
total of 1632 questionnaires were effectively delivered
and 484 households responded, for a response rate of
29.4%. Figure 2 presents the distribution of (a) sampled
households and (b) returned questionnaires in 15 areas.
The figure also shows a range in elevation above sea level
for each area (A1–A15). In order to protect privacy, we
labeled each questionnaire with distance and direction to
the industrial park only, instead of asking respondents to
provide their detailed addresses or making any marks on
questionnaire sheets. Thus, we only have the number of
respondents from each of these areas.
The questionnaire was composed of 14 pages with
questions about respondents’ evacuation and reentry
experiences regarding the Natech accidents during the
earthquake and tsunami. Results regarding the evacuees’
risk perception and protective behavior response are dis-
cussed in this article. Of the 484 respondents, the average
age was 61, and 55.8% were men. The majority were house
owners with no evacuation or training experiences with
Natech accidents. Households with couples and two gen-
erations answered 36.2 and 36.6% of the questionnaires,
respectively. The length of residence extends from less
than 10 years to more than 40 years. The results are sum-
marized in Table 2. Comparison of the sample’s demo-
graphic characteristics to the 2010 Census data of Japan
suggests that, with exception of an overrepresentation of
respondents who were homeowners and from larger
households, the sample is relatively representative of the
whole population.
Fig. 2 Distribution of a sampled households showed with pins in colors and b returned questionnaires in the 15 areas sampled including the
range of the elevation above sea level for each area (A1–A15)
2 Zenrin Company. Address index database. Available at http://www.
zenrin.co.jp/english/index.html (updated Aug, 24, 2012, bought Apr,
2014)
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5 Results
Of the 484 respondents, 311 (64.3%) evacuated at least
once, 149 (30.8%) evacuated twice, 99 (20.5%) evacuated
three times, and 41 (8.5%) evacuated four times. Further-
more, 153 out of 484 (31.6%) respondents indicated they
did not evacuate, and 20 (4%) of them did not respond to
this question. Households evacuated more than once
because of the multiple hazards they encountered or other
reasons. Respondents were asked to indicate the reasons for
each evacuation by providing a list of multiple options. A
total of 179 (37.0%) respondents said they evacuated due to
the earthquake and/or tsunami at least once. Similarly, 128
(26.4%) respondents said they evacuated due to the Natech
accident at least once. As indicated in Fig. 3, for the first
evacuation, 168 out of 311 evacuees evacuated because of
the earthquake and tsunami (54.0%), and 92 (29.6%) of
them evacuated for the Natech accident. The number of
respondents that indicated that they evacuated a second
time due to the earthquake/tsunami decreased substantially
(21.5%). Instead, 32.9% of respondents indicated that they
evacuated a second time for the Natech accident, and
26.2% of respondents evacuated a second time due to
shelter problems such as a shelter was too crowed or lacked
necessities for family members with special needs. During
the third and fourth evacuations, the natural disaster and
Natech accident were not the primary reasons for evacu-
ating. In addition to indicating shelter problems, some
respondents said they were rescued by the Japanese Ground
Self-Defense Force3 or picked up by other family mem-
bers. Very few respondents indicated that they evacuated
because of seeing others’ actions (peers).
Table 2 Demographic statistics for respondents
Gender House ownership
Male Female No answer Yes No No answer
55.8% 38.2% 6.0% 89.7% 5.5% 4.8%
Natech accident evacuation experience Natech accident training experience
Yes No No answer Yes No No answer
1.2% 92.4% 6.4% 12.0% 84.5% 3.5%
Household size
Single Couple 2 generations 3 generations [3 generations No answer
6.4% 36.2% 36.6% 13.2% 5.1% 2.5%
Residency length
≤10 years [10 ≤ 20 years [20 ≤ 30 years [30 ≤ 40 years [40 years No answer





























Earthquake and/or tsunami Natech Peers Shelter problem Others
Fig. 3 The number of
respondents during the multiple
evacuations and the reasons for
evacuating
3 The Japan Ground Self-Defense Forces (自衛隊 Jieitai) are the
military forces of Japan and controlled by the Ministry of Defense.
They conducted emergency response and search and rescue following
the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami of 2011.
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5.1 Changes of Risk Perceptions
We used likelihood and severity to measure the risk per-
ception levels by asking: how likely do you think a Natech
accident would be a threat to your life or property: 1 (very
unlikely) to 5 (very likely) before the quake, just after the
earthquake shaking, and in the next 10 years. Furthermore,
we asked to what extent households felt that a Natech
accident would affect their lives or property: 1 (small
extent) to 4 (very great extent) before the quake, just after
the earthquake shaking, when they perceived the occur-
rence of the Natech accident, when they received the
Natech accident evacuation order, while staying at the
evacuation shelters, and in the next 10 years. One-way
repeated measures ANOVA tests were conducted to
determine if household risk perception levels changed
significantly during the Natech accident. The results show
that households’ risk perception in terms of the perceived
likelihood that a Natech would cause harm to their lives or
property before the quake, just after the earthquake shak-
ing, and in the next 10 years were significantly different, F
(1.70, 591.20) = 25.05, p \ 0.001, with Greenhouse-
Geisser correction. Notably, as indicated in Fig. 4, as
expected, household’s risk perception in terms of the per-
ceived likelihood increased after experiencing the Natech
during the quake, t (368) = −6.81, p\ 0.001.
The effect of time periods on household risk perception
in terms of perceived Natech severity was not significant
(Wilks’Λ = 0.21, F(6,4) = 2.45, p = 0.20, MANOVA). As
presented in Fig. 5, no change was found in risk perception
in terms of the perceived severity of the impacts of a
Natech accident when compared with their responses
before the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and
in the next 10 years. This may be due to the fact that no
deaths, injuries, or severe environmental damage due to the
Natech was reported. In addition, we found that households
felt that the Natech would affect their lives to a great extent
(score = 3) and to a very great extent (score = 4) in four
time periods: when they perceived its occurrence
(M = 3.48 ± 0.75); while they were staying at the first/
second evacuation shelter (M = 3.49 ± 0.74,
M = 3.44 ± 0.82); and when they received the Natech
evacuation order (M = 3.55 ± 0.70).
Tests were conducted to determine if a significant
relationship exists between respondents’ geographic loca-
tions and risk perception in four time periods. As Fig. 6
shows, risk perceptions decreased with distance to the
Natech hazard in all time periods except when respondents
received the Natech evacuation order. One-between-one-
within ANOVA tests were conducted with distance to the
Natech hazard (≤1 km,[1 km and ≤1.5 km,[1.5 km and
≤2 km, and[2 km and ≤2.5 km) as between-subjects and
four time periods (before the quake, just after the earth-
quake shaking, when respondents perceived the Natech
occurrence, and when they received the Natech evacuation
order) as the within-subjects variables. The main effect of
between-subjects variables shows that respondents’ risk
perceptions in terms of likelihood (before the quake and
just after the earthquake shaking) were significantly dif-
ferent according to their distance to the Natech accident (F
(3, 441) = 5.94, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.04). However, the effect of
distance on risk perception in terms of severity (during the
four examined time periods) was not significant (F(3,
139) = 1.04, p = 0.38, η2 = 0.02).
Furthermore, we examined the change in risk perception
with the range of the elevation of the area of each house-
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Fig. 4 Mean risk likelihood rating for Natech
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Fig. 5 Mean risk severity
ratings for Natech throughout
the evacuation process
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Natech hazard. The results are shown in Fig. 7. We used
two-between-one-within ANOVA tests to find the signifi-
cance. Between subjects were direction (west and east)
and elevation (≤5, and[5 m), and within subjects were
risk perceptions in four time periods (before the quake,
just after the earthquake shaking, when respondents per-
ceived the Natech occurrence, and when they received a
Natech evacuation order). Results show that households
living in the east side of the Natech hazard perceived
significantly higher Natech risk in terms of likelihood
(before the quake and just after the earthquake shaking) (F
(1, 441) = 18.67, p\ 0.01, η2 = 0.04). Those respondents
living at a lower elevation (≤5 m) also perceived higher
Natech risk in terms of likelihood (before the quake and
just after the earthquake shaking) than those at a higher
elevation ([5 m) (F(1, 441) = 8.44, p = 0.008, η2 = 0.02).
However, respondents’ perceived that Natech risk in terms
of its severity (during the four examined time periods) was
not significantly different according to the direction and
elevation.
5.2 Behavioral Response
Respondents were specially asked to indicate what they did
to protect themselves or family members after perceiving
the Natech accident by themselves (through its environ-
mental cues such as seeing the fire or smelling the smoke)
or from the local government’s warning. They were asked
to select one or more of the following options: immediately
evacuated, immediately prepared for evacuation, closed the
windows and doors, tried to find more information (sear-
ched for information), got out of the house to see the
accident situation (assessed situation), continued normal
activities, and took other actions.
Fig. 6 Mean perceived risk by
distance
Fig. 7 Mean perceived risk by
location direction and elevation
Fig. 8 Protective actions after
perceiving the Natech accident
(N = 484)
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Figure 8 presents the protective actions taken by
households after perceiving the Natech accident. For ease
of analysis, the protective actions have been classified into
four groups as shown at the bottom of the figure. These
results show that more than a third of respondents contin-
ued normal activities when they perceived the Natech
(32.4%). Only 10.5% of respondents evacuated immedi-
ately, but 34.5% of them took other protective actions, such
as prepared to evacuate or closed windows/doors, and so
on. Respondents who indicated they evacuated immedi-
ately and adopted other protective actions at the same time
(for example, close the windows/doors) were classified as
“evacuated.”
Even though a relatively small group of households
evacuated immediately after perceiving the Natech danger,
some of them evacuated later. Table 3 presents households’
evacuations for the Natech accident according to evacua-
tion timing for the four groups as shown in Fig. 8. As
shown in Table 3, of the 484 respondents, 92 (19.0%) left
home because of the Natech accident; whereas 222 (45.9%)
evacuated for reasons such as the earthquake, tsunami, and
so on. Furthermore, there were 153 (31.6%) respondents
who did not evacuate. Among the Natech evacuees, 55.4%
of them evacuated immediately after perceiving the Natech
accident and 26.1% of them adopted other protective
measures before evacuating. Moreover, 15.2% of them also
evacuated even though they initially continued normal
activities (13.0%) or did something else (2.2%) before
evacuating. A high percentage (39.2%) of households did
not evacuate, but sheltered at home by adopting other
protective actions.
Households’ behavioral responses to the Natech acci-
dent may be affected by their locations and risk percep-
tions. For example, respondents living near the industrial
park may have perceived the Natech earlier and considered
it serious, which may have motivated them to evacuate
immediately. In comparison, those living at greater dis-
tances from the industrial park may have perceived the
Natech late and paid less attention to it. Thus, they may
have chosen to shelter at home by adopting other protective
actions, such as search for more information or prepare to
evacuate, or even to do nothing.
5.3 Correlates of Risk Perception
The relationship between risk perceptions and location and
demographic characteristics in four time periods (before
the quake, just after the earthquake shaking, when
respondents perceived the Natech occurrence, and when
they received the Natech evacuation order) was examined.
Geographic variables included coded variables corre-
sponding to the distance between the house and the refinery
(1 = ≤1 km, 2 =[1 km and ≤1.5 km, 3 =[1.5 km and
≤2 km, 4 =[2 km and ≤2.5 km), the location of the house
with respect to the industrial park (1 = east, 0 = west), and
the average elevation of each area. Demographic charac-
teristics included gender (0 = male, 1 = female), age,
household size (1 = single, 2 = couples, 3 = two genera-
tions, 4 = three generations, 5 = more than three genera-
tions), and residence length (1 = 10 years or less, 2 = more
than 10–20 years, 3 = more than 20–30 years, 4 = more
than 30–40 years, 5 = more than 40 years).
As indicated in Table 4, respondents’ risk perceptions
were associated with their locations. Specifically, signifi-
cant negative correlations were found between distance to
the industrial park and the risk perceptions in three time
periods. This indicates that households’ risk perceptions
before the quake, just after the earthquake shaking, and
when they perceived the Natech accident decreased with
the distance to the Natech hazards. Furthermore, we found
that households living to the east of the industrial park felt
that a Natech accident was more likely to threaten their
lives or property before the quake (r = 0.17) and just after
the earthquake shaking (r = 0.16). They also felt more
threatened by the Natech accident when they received its
linked evacuation order (r = 0.16). In addition, the results
indicate that households living in high places felt less













Evacuated for the Natech 51 (55.4%) 24 (26.1%) 12 (13.0%) 2 (2.2%) 3 (3.3%) 92 (19.0%)
Evacuated for other
reasons
0 79 (35.6%) 75 (33.8%) 55 (24.8%) 13 (5.9%) 222
(45.9%)
Did not evacuate 0 60 (39.2%) 66 (43.1%) 25 (16.3%) 2 (1.3%) 153
(31.6%)
Unknown 0 4 (23.5%) 4 (23.5%) 4 (23.5%) 5 (29.4%) 17 (3.5%)
Total 51 (10.5%) 167 (34.5%) 157 (32.4%) 86 (17.8%) 23 (4.8%) 484
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threatened by the Natech accident just after the earthquake
shaking (r = −0.10).
Gender and age were found to be correlated with risk
perception. Specifically, men (r = −0.10/−0.13) and older
people (r = 0.15/0.16) were more likely to regard a Natech
accident as a threat to their lives or property before the
quake and just after the earthquake shaking. However,
younger households felt more threaten by the Natech
accident when they perceived its occurrence (r = −0.17). In
addition, the results also show that long-term residents had
higher risk perception levels in terms of perceived likeli-
hood just after the earthquake shaking (r = 0.10).
5.4 Correlates of Protective Actions
We examined the correlations between location, demo-
graphic characteristics, risk perception, and three types of
protective actions: immediate evacuation, delayed evacu-
ation, and shelter in place. Based on the results in Table 4,
respondents who indicated they evacuated immediately
after perceiving the Natech were recorded as 1 = yes,
others were 0 = no. Those who delayed evacuations were
recorded as 1 = yes, others were 0 = no. Finally, those who
sheltered in place were recorded as 1 = yes, others were
0 = no.
We found that households’ evacuation behavior differed
significantly by locations. Specifically, households living in
proximity to the Natech accident were more likely to
evacuate at once when they perceived its threat (r = −0.12),
whereas those living further away tended to shelter in place
(r = 0.21). Moreover, those at a higher elevation were also
prone to delay their evacuation (r = 0.27) and shelter in
place (r = 0.18). Furthermore, those living to the east side
of the industrial park were more likely to evacuate
immediately (r = 0.23) and, even for those did not evacuate
initially were more likely to evacuate than those in the west
side (r = 0.32) some time later.
Households were also more likely to evacuate after
perceiving the Natech accident if: (1) they thought it very
likely that their lives or property were threatened by the
Natech accident before the Great East Japan Earthquake
and Tsunami and just after the earthquake shaking; and (2)
they considered that the Natech would affect their lives and
property to a very great extent just after the earthquake
shaking and when they perceived it.
5.5 Prediction of Immediate Evacuation
A logistic regression was conducted to predict households’
immediate evacuation behavior using geographic, risk
perception, and demographic variables. As indicated in
Table 5, predictor variables account for 32% (Nagelkerke-
R2) of the variance in predicting evacuation after perceiv-
ing the Natech. Coefficients on two variables of interest are
statistically significant. The first significant predictor indi-
cates that people living to the east of the industrial park
were approximately 12 times (exp (B) = 11.41) more likely
to evacuate when they perceived the Natech accident. The
second significant predictor indicates that for each addi-
tional one-point increase in severity ratings when house-
holds perceived the Natech accident, they were 5.89 times
(exp (B) = 5.89) more likely to evacuate.
6 Discussion
In response to the first research question concerning Natech
accident risk perception change through an evacuation
process, this article analyzed the change of household risk
perception during the Natech accident evacuation. Recog-
nizing changes in risk perception can assist in under-
standing when people will take protective actions such as
evacuation (Lindell and Prater 2012). This is important to
understand the role that risk perception plays in triggering
multiple evacuations. Previous studies have shown that risk
perception was strongly related to evacuation decisions
(Baker 1991; Huang et al. 2012; Lindell et al. 2015). But
emergency managers also need to know when household
evacuation may begin (for example, evacuation based on a
person’s own judgment, after an evacuation order) in order
to allocate emergency resources or start special protective
plans. This study confirms and extends the former finding
Table 5 Prediction of immediate evacuation in the Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami event (GEJET)
Variables B Standard error Exp (B)
Distance 0.13 0.66 1.14
Direction 2.44* 1.16 11.41
Elevation −0.06 0.13 0.94
L_before GEJET 0.49 0.45 1.64
S_before GEJET 0.20 0.41 1.23
L_just after ES 0.52 0.45 1.69
S_just after ES −0.48 0.50 0.62
S_after Per 1.77* 0.83 5.89
S_when Rec −0.37 0.58 0.69
Female −.003 0.57 0.10
Age 0.04 0.03 1.04
HH Size 0.37 0.29 1.44
Res_length 0.04 0.16 1.04




** p\ 0.01; * p\ 0.05
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that higher risk perception levels occurred while evacuees
were staying at evacuation shelters (Siebeneck and Cova
2012). The results of this study show that there was higher
household risk perception in terms of perceived severity of
the Natech accident: when they perceived the Natech
accident, when they received evacuation order, and while
they were staying at the first or second evacuation shelter.
Concerning the second research question (What pro-
tective actions did households take in response to the
Natech accident?), our results show that only 10.4% of
respondents evacuated immediately after perceiving the
Natech threat, whereas 34.5% of them adopted other pro-
tective actions instead. This finding is consistent with an
earlier study on households’ immediate response to the
2009 American Samoa earthquake and tsunami (Lindell
et al. 2015). The authors also found that people did not
leave immediately after the earthquake shaking but
attempted to obtain additional information, packed an
emergency kit, or protected property. Searching for more
information was also found to be one of the primary pro-
tective actions in this study (12% of the respondents tried
to do so). Furthermore, a relatively large group of
respondents (32.4%) continued their normal activities after
perceiving the Natech accident. Not being familiar with the
Natech phenomenon or not receiving the Natech evacua-
tion order may be the reason for this.
The third objective was to explore whether households
in different locations perceived different Natech risks and
adopted different protective actions. Results that show risk
perception levels decreasing with distance to the Natech
accident are consistent with the findings in other studies
concerning hurricane evacuation (Baker 1991; Lindell and
Prater 2004). Furthermore, we also found that respondents
living to the east of the industrial park felt they were more
likely to be affected by the Natech accident before the
quake, and just after the earthquake shaking, than those
living to the west. Based on data from the Japan Meteo-
rological Agency (JMA), the annual average wind direction
of the investigated area was northwest (JMA 2014). This
indicates that households living in the eastside may have
been more worried about their safety because they could
smell or see the smoke driven by the wind. To understand
why households on the east side believed the Natech could
affect their lives or property to a very great extent after
receiving the evacuation order, we need further analysis.
One possibility may be the warning message. Lindell and
Perry state that the warning source, warning channels, and
message content stimulate recipients to establish a threat
belief in and response to the disaster (Lindell and Prater
2004). Further research could examine the way that these
three components influence risk perception when house-
holds received the Natech evacuation order.
Concerning protective actions, we found that households
living close to the industrial park were more likely to
evacuate immediately after perceiving the Natech accident,
whereas those living further away tended to shelter at
home. According to Huang et al. (2012) this is because
residents who are closer to the hazards are more likely to
personalize the risk by anticipating more severe impacts
from those threats.
Our study also indicates that households located to the
leeward side (east) of the industrial park were more likely
to evacuate immediately when they perceived the Natech
threat or evacuated later if needed. This may be due to the
wind direction, which was predominantly from west to
east. Table 6 shows that during the duration (91 h) of the
Natech accident, the wind direction was east for a period of
58 h with an average wind speed of 2.72 m/s. This indicates
that more households to the east side may have evacuated
because they smelled the smoke driven by the wind. This is
good news because those living in that direction may be
more likely to be affected by the flames or toxic vapors
resulted from fires or hazardous material releases carried
by the wind. However, residents on the windward side may
be at risk of explosion hazards and thus should also be
aware of the potential dangers and the actions that they
should take to protect themselves. Therefore measures
should be also taken to increase their Natech-related
knowledge and disaster preparedness.
The examination of the relationship between risk per-
ception and evacuation behavior by both correlation and
regression analysis suggests that households were more
likely to evacuate immediately if they felt their lives or
property would be impacted by the Natech accident to a
very great extent when they perceived its occurrence.
Our study results are similar to the findings of other
scholars that show that demographic variables have weak
and inconsistent correlations with risk perception and
protective responses (Baker 1991; Lindell and Perry 2000;
Steinberg et al. 2004; Lindell et al. 2015). For example, our
results regarding gender are inconsistent with prior
research, which found that women perceived disaster
events or threats as more severe and risky than men
(Bateman and Edwards 2002). However, we found that
men were more likely to consider a Natech accident as a
threat to their lives or property in two time periods: before
Table 6 Wind direction, duration, and speed during the Natech
accident. Source JMA (2014)




From 9 p.m. 11 March to 15 p.m. 15 March, 91 h
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the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and just after
the earthquake shaking. Age may play a role in this result,
because older respondents were also found to be more
likely to worry about their lives or property being affected
by a Natech accident in the same time periods. Thus, fur-
ther studies should be conducted to analyze the risk per-
ception of subgroups such as older women or younger men.
Moreover, age was not a persistent determinant of risk
perception, for after perceiving the Natech accident, the
older respondents conversely regarded the Natech as a less
severe threat.
7 Study Limitations
This study has some limitations. First, data collection was
carried out about 3 years after the Natech accident occurred
during the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. This
raises questions regarding respondents’ answers concern-
ing their perceived risks at the time of the disaster. Lindell
et al. (2015) found that people tend to have good memories
of events that are personally relevant to them. During our
interviews with residents in the affected area to test the
survey questionnaires, many residents described their
feeling and actions during the Natech accident clearly. The
earthquake and tsunami and the Natech accident that fol-
lowed comprised a devastating event that has marked res-
idents personally and significantly. Thus, it appears to be
reasonable to draw conclusions based on the collected data.
Second, although this study has examined the effects of
three significant factors (risk perception, location, and
demographic characteristics) on household behavioral
response to the Natech threat, some bias may have been
introduced because the respondents’ house damage state
was not discussed. Severely damaged houses may have
forced people to adopt immediate protective actions, such
as evacuate immediately. Thus, further studies should
consider this potentially influential factor.
Another limitation comes from potential sample bias.
Information concerning residents who moved away from
the surveyed areas is unknown. This group of residents
may have been severely affected by the Natech accident.
Their absence from the study’s data base could have
introduced a bias into the study results.
8 Conclusion
This study has presented the results of a random household
mail survey on risk perception and behavioral responses to
a Natech accident experienced at an industrial park in
Sendai, Japan, after the Great East Japan Earthquake and
Tsunami of 2011. Interestingly, the evacuation process that
followed the earthquake, tsunami, and Natech accident
involved multiple evacuations. The study showed that
Natech risk perception changed throughout the evacuation
process. Comparatively low mean risk perception levels (in
terms of perceived likelihood) occurred before the earth-
quake. Higher mean risk perception levels (in terms of
perceived severity) occurred when households perceived
the Natech accident, especially while they were staying at
either the first or second evacuation shelter, and when they
received the actual Natech evacuation order. Furthermore,
the study confirmed that risk perception has a significant
and positive effect on evacuation behavior. Thus, finding
ways to improve households’ risk perception concerning
Natech hazards may lead to increased evacuation for any
future Natech accident. This finding is important because it
confirms the conclusion of previous research that expected
personal impacts are strong motivation for a person’s
protective actions (Fitzpatrick and Mileti 1991; Sorensen
2000; Huang et al. 2012; Lindell and Prater 2012).
The study showed that almost 30% of respondents
evacuated at least once for the Natech accident. But the
majority did not evacuate immediately, and instead adop-
ted other protective actions when they perceived the Nat-
ech threat. Inside this group, 12% of respondents tried to
search for more information. According to Sorensen, the
single most important factor in determining when people
will leave is when they are informed about the danger
(Sorensen 1991). The information may concern the cer-
tainty, severity, and immediacy of the threat, and identify
logistical support for protective actions such as suit-
able evacuation routes, destinations, and modes of trans-
portation, and so on (Lindell and Prater 2012). Therefore,
local government officials and industrial facility operators
should provide adequate and timely information and
instructions to residents about protective measures at the
time of an evacuation order. Prior natural and technological
disaster preparedness planning is needed to insure that
residents in potentially impacted areas will know what
protective actions they can take in case of a Natech acci-
dent. Unfortunately, there is very little information cur-
rently provided to residents living near industrial parks in
Japan concerning hazards that result from the handling of
hazardous materials and the measures citizens can take to
protect themselves in the event of a chemical accident, and
even less concerning the chemical accidents triggered by
an earthquake and/or tsunami.
Future studies should pay special attention to the need
for multiple evacuations. It is not clear if the high number
of Sendai evacuations can be expected during every future
Natech accident. Studies that investigate how common it is
for households to evacuate multiple times and the reasons
for the multiple evacuations should be carried out.
Emphasis should also be placed on identifying the specific
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threats present during the multiple evacuations and how
emergency mangers can effectively manage the multiple
evacuation process. In addition, studies should also
examine the return process after a Natech accident.
Because Natech accidents are associated with hazardous or
toxic materials releases, it is challenging for local author-
ities as well as evacuees to know when it is safe to return.
The findings here presented on risk perception and
behavioral responses of households in Sendai, when faced
with a Natech accident during the Great East Japan
Earthquake and Tsunami, provide important insight for
future disaster preparedness planning in Japan as well as in
other countries.
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